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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs . 
WADE WAGSTAFF, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 920142-CA 
Argument Priority No. (b) (11) 
Reply Brief of Appellant 
INTRODUCTION 
The analysis in Plaintiff/Appellee's Response Brief fails to 
address the primary issue presented in this case, that is; can 
something which is obtained in violation of an individuals state 
and federal constitutional rights be the basis for charged under 
U.C.A. 76-8-510(1). The Plaintiff/Appel1ee's brief is devoid of 
analysis of the unconstitutional seizure of evidence which is 
central to the charge against Defendant/Appellant. 
Defendant/Appellant has presented case law from two sister juris-
dictions which analyze the impact of unconstitutional seizure of 
evidence in the prosecution of person charged under similar state 
laws. Both decisions required the dismissal of the charges of 
"tampering with evidence" brought under similar state statutes. 
Plaintiff/Appellee has failed to address these precedence which 
therefore stand unrebutted. Plaintiff/Appel1ee failed to 
distinguish those cases because no American court has allowed 
prosecution for tampering with evidence when the charge was based 
upon illegal search and seizure and the "evidence" was the fruit 
of the poisonous tree. 
In an effort to sanitize the State's position the 
Plaintiff/Appellee1s brief fails to use the word "unconstitutional" 
in either of its arguments. The State's position discusses "the 
admissability of evidence" as if there is some sort of foundation 
or relevance objection pending in a trial. The fact that the 
"evidence" is the fruit of the poisonous tree is not addressed. 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S FIRST POINT 
The first point of Plaintiff/Appel1eefs brief can be fairly 
summarized as arguing that "anything means anything." However, 
Plaintiff/Appellee in its brief (p. 6) modifies its initial 
position by stating: 
Rather, as the trial court recognized, the statute 
prohibits tampering with "anything" that may be used in 
an investigation or proceeding, regardless of its 
admissability. 
(Emphasis added herein, not in original text). 
The reality of the case before the court is that whatever it 
was that was unconstitutionally taken from Defendant/Appellant and 
is the subject of the alleged tampering may not be used for any 
purpose because it is the fruit of the poisonous tree (T. p.23, L. 
23-25) . 
Plaintiff/Appellee argues that "the language of Utah's 
evidence tampering statute is plain and unambiguous" and then goes 
on to argue that the statutes use of the term "anything" is not 
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restricted by the modifying terminology which directly follows it 
in the statute, thereby expanding the application of the law far 
beyond the normal meaning of evidence. Defendant/Appellant would 
suggest the plain language of the statute has only to do with 
evidence and that Plaintiff/Appel1eefs plain language argument 
would only apply to a statute entitled "tampering with anything." 
As discussed in Defendant/Appellant's brief (p. 9) the concept of 
the statute's application to "anything" as advanced by 
Plaintiff/Appellee would require an unconstitutionally broad 
application of the statute. This Court in interpreting the 
language of a statute has the obligation to interpret the law in 
a fashion which is constitutional, if possible. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Utah State Road Com'n v. Frieberg, 
687 P.2d 81 (Utah 1984) articulated the duty of the Court in 
interpreting statutory language. The Court stated: 
In the first place, a fundamental principle of 
statutory construction is that a statute should be 
construed as a whole, and its terms should be construed 
to be harmonious with each other and the overall 
objective of the statute. Cannon v. McDonald, Utah, 615 
P.2d 1268 (1980); Crist v. Bishop, Utah, 615 P.2d 196 
(1974). Moreover, we are constrained to construe 
statutory terms to avoid any unconstitutional application 
of the statute. State v. Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71 (1982); 
In re: Boyer, Utah 636 P.2d 1085 (1981). 
Plaintiff/Appel1ee's discussion of the language of U.C.A. 76-
8-510(1) centers on a single word without discussion of the 
modifiers used or the objective of the statute. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the terms of a statute 
entitled "Tampering with Evidence" should most likely have some-
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thing to do with evidence. If that evidence is tainted by 
unconstitutional conduct it must then be suppressed and it cannot 
"be used in an investigation or proceeding" (Plaintiff/Appel1eefs 
brief, p, 6). Plaintiff/AppeI 1ee v;i oeo jpon the Court an 
interpretation of U.C.A. 76-8-510(1) which is unconstitutionally 
broad and therefore should be rejected. 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S SECOND POINT 
PIaintiff/Appel1eefs second point involves legislative intent. 
Plaintiff/Appellee's notes that in debate of the legislation 
e n a c 11 n g , a m o i I g c t h e r statutes, Section 7 6 -0 8-510(1) the Model 
Penal Code was mentioned. ?!aintiff/Appel1ee concludes, therefore, 
that the commentary accomsnv: *-g the Model Penal Code was known to 
the lawmakers and intended by the legislature to be relevant. 
Plaintiff/Appellee fails to note that the Model Penal Code language 
and discussion were not aaoptea c1 •»--•,, < - • * . 
draf1 of the legislation plaintii: £;p*-. •- as*:- t:.:. :„ui* 
make assumptions about rA- legislative :nter/ ;\; *-. ,1:* :\ : -- . ^<;v 
in the history of trie statute. w: i -- - * - * . 
legislature i s his+" ori ^ a1 1 v ^^^orop ::.- Cou; " . r..:i, .J :.,^  
participate in specu.at. r :- .icec r-v I . 3 intif f /Appel 1 ee . If the 
legislature intended the • - *-,*.T.*-- \ ei Pena . -• e 
directive in future r^.a'.vGi; :' v:j. : h-ve noted it in the history 
and analysis of the law. : r. a:..-we: * * \- Plaintiff/Appel lee's 
assertion that the Model F- :. -> -• =. -*- * ne prosecution of 
a tampering with evidence charge when the "evidence" is illegally 
obtained, Plaintiff/Appel1ee would point out that the Florida 
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statute (see Plaintiff/Appel1ee Addendum 5) which was interpreted 
in Sites v. Florida 582 So.2d 813 (Pla. App. 4th Dist. 1991) 
discussed in Plaintiff/Appel1eefs brief (p. 15-16) employs, in 
relevant part, the exact language of the Model Penal Code (See 
Plaintiff/Appellee ' s brief p. 8) while Utah's equivalent has been 
changed somewhat. The factual scenario in Sites, supra, as 
discussed in Plaintiff/Appel1ee's brief, is hauntingly similar to 
this case and the Court, after determining that the "evidence" was 
unconstitutionally seized, dismissed the charge of tampering with 
evidence. 
The Model Penal Code commentary cited in Plaintiff/Appel1ee's 
brief (at p. 9) discusses "the preventing and punishing obstruction 
of justice." While Plaintiff/Appel1ee refuses to accept the 
application of the commentary as binding upon the Court's analysis 
of U.C.A. 76-8-510(1), the discussion is valuable in examining the 
Utah Supreme Court's treatment of an analogous scenario. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in State in the Interest of Hurley, 
501 P.2d 111 (Utah 1972) considered a factual scenario wherein a 
University of Utah police officer, while patrolling an area which 
was not on the University campus was involved in an altercation 
with two juveniles. The Court analyzed the elements of the charge 
of obstructing and found that because the officer was not strictly 
within the defined jurisdictional limits of his authority, the 
element of the offense requiring the state to show that the officer 
was "engaged in the performance of an official duty" had not been 
established and the conviction of the lower court was reversed. 
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In Hurley, unlike the present case, the actions of the officer were 
not in violation of constitutional principles but were merely not 
"an official duty." The present case presents a far more 
compelling factual scenario for this court to consider the 
deterrent effect (cited in footnote 3 of Plaintiff/Appel1ee's 
Brief, p. 9) discussed by Professor LaFave. To allow a prosecution 
for "tampering" with evidence which was seized in violation of 
state and federal constitutional protections would encourage the 
further violation of these principles by the police. When 
ana] yzing a charge analogous to obstruction of justice it is proper 
to consider the word "justice." Justice cannot be served by 
allowing officers to trampl- -he most important constitutional 
protections available to t \ - ^ . :ens and withdraw a valid indict-
ment from the wreckage. 
The Model Penal Code discussion does not address 
unconstitutiona 11 y o b t a i n e d e v i d e n c e a n d. its hypothetical and 
somewhat metaphysical analysis has no relevance to this case. This 
case is concerned with the violation of Article I, Section 14 of 
the Constitution of Utah :^, . • : - -.-..• -nd Fourteenth Amendments 
to this Constitution of :h- United States, issues which were 
omitted from Piaintiff/Appel1ee's analysis. (Plaintiff/Appellee's 
brief p.2) 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff/Appellee has urged an unreasonable and 
unconstitutionally broad interpretation of I J.C.A. 76-8-510(1) upon 
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this court which should be rejected. Defendant/Appellant's 
position can be fairly summarized as follows: 
Whatever the Utah Legislature intended when it 
drafted U.C.A. 76-8-510(1), when applied to the case at 
hand, the word "anything" cannot include that which is 
the fruit of the poisonous tree. 
Both relevant case law from sister state jurisdictions which 
have previously considered this issue and policy consideration of 
constitutional protection require the reversal of the decision of 
the lower court. The charge of tampering with evidence against 
Defendant/Appellant should therefore be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this _/ S~~~ day of October, 1992. 
EDWIN T. PETERS6U\, E. 
Defendant/Appellant 
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